Despite all this, Burma's defences were very weak when the Pacific war broke out. Since 1937 the country had fluctuated between the Indian and the Far Eastern Commands, but had been rather neglected by both. On 12th December 1941 Wavell (C-in-C India) brought it under Indian Command, but when he became ABDA commander Burma shifted once again. Lieutenant-General Hutton was GOC Burma; his forces included two British battalions and two Indian brigades, plus the more doubtful Burma Rifles and Burma Military Police, whose numbers were being rapidly expanded. The air-raid warning system was poor, and the only fighter protection was provided by sixteen Buffaloes together with the twenty-one P-40 Tomahawks of the American Volunteer Group, which Chiang Kai-Shek had agreed to lend. The Generalissimo had offered two Chinese armies as well, but this Wavell had turned down, assuming that the Japanese would not get past Malaya; only one Chinese division was accepted, therefore, and it covered the Shan States. Due to this apparent rebuff, and to a dispute over the allocation of supplies passing through Rangoon, Anglo-Chinese relations were not very cordial. Furthermore little help would be forthcoming from the Burmese population, among whom were many Japanese sympathisers.
To Japan, the overrunning of Burma was seen as a vital measure to force the Chinese to surrender, Lieutenant-General Iida of Fifteenth Army was appointed for this task and given two divisions (33rd and 55th) which, together with supporting units, totalled 35,440 men. Air support was initially provided by the hundred planes of the 10th Air Brigade but after the fall of Manila this number was doubled. The strategy was to be the simple one of moving into southern Burma, advancing upon Rangoon and then proceeding further north. On 8th December Fifteenth Army occupied Siam together with Yamashita's Twenty-fifth Army. Immediately, forces were sent into the Kra isthmus and on the 16th the key British airbase of Victoria Point was seized. After that, Iida's forces concentrated upon the 'pacification' of Siam and preparations for the next advance.
Although there was little ground fighting for a month, Japan used this period to try to establish her air superiority over southern Burma. However, in raids upon Rangoon on 23rd and 25th December, thirty-one of her planes were shot down for the loss of twelve Allied aircraft. Yet nearly 3,000 civilians were killed by bombs and great panic was caused. The vital Indian labour force streamed westwards, blocking the roads and causing defence works and the unloading of ships to be disrupted. Moreover, a greater proportion of the total Allied air strength had been destroyed. Shortly afterwards, though, to redress the balance somewhat, thirty Hurricanes arrived and soon accounted for fifty Japanese planes for the loss of twelve of their own; and a new Blenheim bomber squadron destroyed fifty-eight Japanese aircraft during an attack upon a Bankok airbase. For a while, at least, the daylight raids upon Rangoon were called off.
Appreciating that the city was vulnerable to land, sea or air attack, General Hutton began to send supplies to the Mandalay region, and to accelerate the construction of a road between Tamu (India) and Kalewa (Burma); thus the Burma Road would still be open and all would not be lost even if Rangoon fell. This was clever anticipation on Hutton's part, for the Japanese were on the move again. By 23rd January the two divisions had occupied all of the area south of Ye, and on the 31st they took Moulmein after heavy fighting with the incomplete 17th Indian Division.
Not only had three major airbases (Victoria Point, Mergui and Moulmein) been lost, therefore, but the Japanese were quickly able to use them to give fighter support to their bombing raids on Rangoon. Moreover, most of the early warning stations had been abandoned and the RAF were at a disadvantage in the air battle.
By the beginning of February, reinforcements were trickling into Rangoon, while two Chinese divisions had moved down to guard the Burma Road and to free further British forces for action. But the Japanese, too, were increasing the pressure. On the 9th of the month, they forced the Salween river and pushed the 17th Indian Division back towards the far weaker position on the Bilin river. At this, its commander, Major-General Smyth, took alarm, for there was a great danger that his troops would be outflanked on this line and then cut off from the vital bridge over the mile-wide Sittang river a little further in the rear. But Hutton and Wavell, who had been appalled by the continuous retreats which had so demoralised the troops in Malaya, did not agree to a withdrawal until it was too late. On the 21st, Japanese forces overtook several British units and threatened to seize the Sittang bridge. Fearing the worst, Smyth ordered its demolition early on the 23rd, with two of his brigades still on the wrong side. While many of the soldiers later managed to cross the river, all their weapons and transport were lost.
Although the valuable 7th Armoured Brigade had reached Burma, Hutton was by now quite convinced that Rangoon would have to be evacuated in order to avoid a second Singapore, and continued to send northwards most of his supplies and ammunition while supervising the demolition of the port installations and oil tanks. However, Churchill, the Chiefs of Staff and Wavell disagreed, pointing out that reinforcements were arriving and that the Japanese air attacks were still being beaten off with heavy losses. On 25th February ABDA Command was dissolved and Wavell returned to his post as C-in-C India, taking Burma under his wing and continuing to believe that the Japanese could be stopped. Moreover, on 5th March General Alexander, who shared the same views, replaced Hutton as GOC and immediately ordered a counterattack near Prome. This effort soon petered out, though, and Alexander had the sense to realise that Hutton had been right and that under the circumstances Rangoon could not be saved. On 7th March he ordered the evacuation of the city and the demolition of all equipment which could be of use to the enemy.
While the depleted air squadrons shifted to central Burma and three ships took many officials to India, the British ground forces had to retreat northwards. After an anxious moment when a Japanese road-block threatened to bottle up all of Alexander's troops, they broke free and scrambled out of reach. At mid-day on the 8th, the 33rd Japanese Division entered a deserted city, realising for the first time that all the birds had flown. Attempts to catch the retreating British served only to exhaust the Japanese infantry and the chase was given up, for the time being at least. They had captured a major port and cut the supply route to China, for the alternative road from India was not yet functioning; but the British troops were saved to fight another day. Credit must be given to Alexander for being flexible enough to change his 'stand fast' policy so quickly, but even more credit should go to Hutton for having pointed, and prepared, the way.
With the battle for Rangoon over, it was obvious that the battle for central Burma would soon commence. By the middle of March, Japanese successes elsewhere in South-East Asia had enabled them to transfer more forces to this region. The arrival of the 56th and 18th Divisions, together with two tank regiments, virtually doubled their ground strength while the air force was again doubled in numbers, from 200 to around 400 planes. Opposing them, Alexander had only two divisions (17th Indian and 1st Burma), the 7th Armoured Brigade and smaller army units, which he now formed into 'Burcorps' under General Slim. In addition, Alexander exercised a vague strategic control of the two Chinese armies (each equivalent in strength to a British division), which were commanded by the American General 'Vinegar Joe' Stilwell. Allied air strength had shrivelled away, following heavy raids upon the bases and the transfer to India on 22nd March. The prospects of holding on to central Burma were not very good.
On 26th March the Japanese attacked Chinese positions around Toungoo, severely mauling the defenders. Pressed to give support, the 17th Indian Division drove southwards towards Okpo but soon learned that a Japanese force had moved around them and captured Shwedaung in their rear. After heavy fighting, the British-Indian troops got clear again but they lost ten tanks and over 300 men. In any case, the Japanese took Toungoo on the 30th and then drove the British out of Prome two days later. Cut off from most supplies, suffering from their long retreat, and continually strafed and bombed by the Japanese air force, the Allied troops were wilting under the strain. Nevertheless, Slim hoped to keep the attackers away from the Yenangyaung oilfields and to hold upper Burma, which would preserve the Burma Road for future use when the link with India had been built.
However, General Iida had different ideas. He planned a further advance in early April, with a swift movement on the right flank to seize Lashio and cut the link with China, followed by a sweep down upon the Irrawaddy to encircle the Allied troops. By 12th April Slim's forces were being engaged along an east-west line Loikaw-Pyinmana-Minhla and slowly compelled to give ground. On the 15th, the Yenangyaung oilfields were destroyed in a blaze of flames and on the following day the 1st Burma Division was surrounded. After confused attempts to relieve them, they broke out but naturally lost a great deal of equipment. Yenangyaung was retaken by the 38th Chinese Division and a fierce battle was promised until news arrived of developments in the east. Iida's scheme to seize Lashio was coming off.
Stilwell had originally hoped to allow the Japanese to move up the Sittang valley and be 'pincered' by his main forces and those in the Karen Hills; but it was precisely in this latter region where the enemy's breakthrough occurred. In quick succession, the Japanese took Mauchi, Namhpe, Loikaw, Hopong and Loilem (23rd April), brushing aside all Chinese attempts at a counterattack. Since the fall of Lashio appeared inevitable, the Allies had to resolve quickly what they should do. Already, on 21st April, the Chinese had abandoned recently-recaptured Yenangyuang. Alexander swiftly decided that if Meiktila fell, the British withdrawal would begin; there would be no pitched battle for Mandalay while there was a chance of a Japanese flanking movement from Lashio. He also decided that all his troops would retreat to India, for although it would have been politically desirable for the British to have kept in contact with the Chinese, Burcorps could not exist without a supply link with India.
On 26th April he ordered a retreat to Kalewa by three different routes. This move was no easy one for two Japanese divisions were hemming them in around the crucial Ava bridge over the Irrawaddy; but strenuous counterattacks, especially by the 7th Armoured Brigade, held them off until the 30th when it was demolished. By this time, Lashio had fallen and the Chinese were cut off from home. More alarmingly, the 215th Japanese Regiment rushed north and captured Monywa on the evening of the 30th, blocking the main road to India. As the British withdrew through the hills and the Japanese advanced up the Chindwin valley, a tremendous race developed for the key crossing at Shwegyin. While a rearguard held the enemy at bay, Burcorps strove to avoid being cut off either by the Japanese or by the monsoon, which was expected in mid-May and which would hamper all movement. By 10th May the rearguard had been forced to give way and abandon Shwegyin but by then many of the British troops had got clear and the remainder marched up-river to a crossing near Kalewa. One week after they reached Tamu in Assam, the monsoon broke fully, although the rains had already halted the Japanese pursuit. Stilwell, leading the remnants of the Fifth Chinese Army, had an even more gruelling time. With the Japanese capture of Myitkyina, he was forced to withdraw into India through the hills; although other Chinese units managed to return home by sweeping north of the town.
The British retreat of 1,000 miles was the longest ever carried out by one of their armies. Much equipment had been discarded on the way, and Burma itself had been lost, but the men had survived around 60,000 of them. Of the 13,000 casualties in the Burma campaign most were prisoners. Japanese casualties totalled around 4,500. They had, particularly in the latter half of the conflict, enjoyed the use of a large naval base (Rangoon), air superiority, and larger and better-equipped ground forces. But it may not be unjust to see Alexander, Slim and Hutton as having been the better generals, given the trying circumstances. Having safely reached India there was the possibility of a breathing-space to build up and properly train their forces and to ponder over the lessons they had learned. Then would come the time to hit back again against the Japanese, whose troops were now stretched over the whole of Burma. But would they get the necessary reinforcements and supplies; and would their restless foe give them the necessary time?
At first, this appeared very unlikely, for as the Allied ground forces were being engaged in central Burma a large Japanese naval detachment moved into the Indian Ocean and threatened the east coast of India and Ceylon. It was vitally important for the British to hold this island, not only for the defence of India, but for the whole structure of power in the Middle and Near East. A Japanese fleet based on Ceylon would be able to interrupt communications between the Cape and India and Australia, and even more important, to cut the links to the Persian Gulf and Suez, thereby halting the flow of oil supplies to Britain and the flow of reinforcements and munitions to the Eighth Army in Egypt. Finally, Ceylon rubber had become increasingly important after the fall of Malaya.
In view of all this, the Chiefs of Staff did all they could to build up the defences of the island. Six brigades were stationed there, despite Wavell's protest that the greatest danger lay in Japanese advance upon the north-east frontier. In the last resort, he was informed, the security of India depended upon their control of the sea lanes in the Indian Ocean and therefore Ceylon was more important than Calcutta. Consequently, an Eastern Fleet under Admiral Somerville was formed, composed of five battleships, three aircraft carriers, seven cruisers and fourteen destroyers. Impressive though it seemed on paper, this force was really quite weak and ill-balanced. One of the carriers and four of the battleships were old, slow and very vulnerable to air attack and, since Somerville's command was only created in late March, these ships had little chance of training as a group. It would be strong enough to guard convoys, or to protect the coastline from light raiding forces, but insufficient to deal with any considerable enemy fleet.
Nevertheless, the Eastern Fleet was large enough to cause some disquiet on the Japanese side. Eager to complete the conquest of Burma before the monsoon began, they planned to make great use of the port of Rangoon, through which they could now send reinforcements and munitions for Iida's Fifteenth Army. Therefore, Vice-Admiral Nagumo's First Air Fleet, under the overall control of Vice-Admiral Kondo, was instructed to enter the Indian Ocean and strike at Ceylon and at Somerville's ships. With five of the Pearl Harbor carriers, escorted by four battleships, three cruisers and eleven destroyers, Nagumo would easily be able to crush any opposition. At the same time, Vice-Admiral Ozawa was to take one light carrier, seven cruisers, and eleven destroyers on a commerce-raiding cruise into the Bay of Bengal. But there was never any thought of invading Ceylon, since the Army General Staff wished to call a halt to distant sorties and commitments; the aim was solely to demonstrate their power, to scatter or destroy the Eastern Fleet, and to cover the troop convoys going to Rangoon.
Somerville, anticipating an attack upon 1st April, had split his vessels into a fast group (the battleship Warspite, and the carriers Indomitable and Formidable) and a slow group (the four R-class battleships, and the small carrier Hermes), both of which patrolled to the south of Ceylon. From this position, he hoped to be able to launch aerial attacks upon the Japanese ships; or, if the latter attempted to invade Ceylon, to engage them at night with his battleships. After two days of fruitless patrolling, Somerville guessed that no raid was forthcoming, ordered his ships to refuel at a secret base in the Maldive Islands, and detached the Hermes to Trincomalee and the heavy cruisers Cornwall and Dorsetshire to Colombo. However, the Japanese attack was planned for 5th April, not, as the British believed, for the 1st; and it was only when the Eastern Fleet was refuelling in the Maldives on the 4th that the enemy ships were sighted by reconnaissance planes. Ordering his slower force to follow later, Somerville immediately left with his fast ships; but he was over 600 miles from Ceylon and he had to bear in mind that he could not take his two modern carriers too close to Nagumo's force without the support of the four R-class battleships.
At Colombo, Vice-Admiral Layton alerted the defences and sent away all shipping; but the inadequate radar system, and the inferiority of the British Fulmar and Hurricane fighters against the more nimble Zeros, were severe disadvantages. At dawn on 5th April Ceylon was attacked by a force of ninety-one bombers and thirty-six fighters. While the damage done to the port itself was not large, and only one merchantman and one destroyer were sunk, twenty-seven planes were shot down for the loss of only seven attackers. Moreover, later in the day, fifty-three Japanese bombers struck at the heavy cruisers Cornwall and Dorsetshire. Diving out of the sun, they hit the warships repeatedly; Cornwall was sunk within twenty-two minutes while the Dorsetshire, shattered by at least nine direct hits, disappeared within eight minutes.
By the next day, Somerville's two groups had been united and he was warily keeping to the south-east of Ceylon, wondering whether the Japanese had discovered his base in the Maldives and were about to attack it. Only on the 8th did he venture to enter harbour. However, Nagumo had been searching well to the east of this and, finding nothing, decided upon another raid, this time upon Trincomalee. On the 9th, the harbour was attacked by 90 planes, 7 of which were shot down at the cost of 9 British fighters and also 5 bombers, who sought to sink the Japanese fleet. Then the small carrier Hermes and the destroyer Vampire were discovered and sunk, together with a corvette, a tanker and a fleet auxiliary ship in the vicinity. Satisfied with these results, the Japanese carriers withdrew and were rejoined later by the commerce raiding force from the Bay of Bengal. The latter had sunk 23 merchantmen (112,000 tons) between the 5th and the 9th, launched air attacks on the Indian coast, and provoked fears of invasion.
The Japanese raid had been a further humiliation of British sea power in the East, and had shown that Somerville's force of mainly slow and old vessels only tempted destruction and would have been of little use in preventing an invasion. In fact, Somerville acknowledged this by his cautious behaviour and by despatching the four R-class battleships to East Africa on 8th April. A fleet of fast carriers and battleships could only be matched by ships of the same type; and until these were available, it was wiser to stay out of sight. Soon, the Eastern Fleet was to be virtually disbanded in order to provide forces for the invasion of Madagascar and the Mediterranean. Fortunately for the British in India, however, Nagumo's devastating raid had not been the harbinger of an invasion attempt but merely a precautionary, covering mission. With this task completed, the Japanese navy was turning its attention to New Guinea and the South-West Pacific.
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