That night Sir Edward Grey told Churchill he doubted whether a course could be devised acceptable both to the Irish Nationalists and the Ulster Unionists. The dispute centred on boundaries, in particular those of County Tyrone. 'Failing an Irish agreement,' Churchill wrote to Grey on July 22, 'there ought to be a British decision.' Of course the contending Irish parties 'may think it worth a war, & from their point of view it may be worth a war. But that is hardly the position of the forty millions who dwell in Great Britain; and their interests must when all said & done be our chief & final care.'
Churchill then gave Grey an analogy based on the European situation. It was his first reference to the European crisis; and it contained a hopeful scenario. 'In foreign affairs you would proceed by two stages,' Churchill explained. 'First you would labour to stop Austria & Russia going to war: second, if that failed, you would try to prevent England, France, Germany and Russia being drawn in.' Exactly what Grey would do in Europe, Churchill added, was right in the 'domestic danger', with the difference that in Europe the second step 'would only hope to limit & localise the conflict; whereas at home the second step, if practicable & adopted, would prevent the local conflict'.
That night it was the imminent breakdown of the Irish negotiations that dominated Churchill's letter to Clementine: 'The conference is in extremis. We are preparing a partition of Tyrone with reluctant Nationalist acquiescence. Carson absolutely refuses.' The Buckingham Palace Conference had broken down. But Carson was to get his wish two days later, when the Cabinet decided to allow any Ulster county to vote itself out of the Home Rule area, and to abolish the six-year time-limit for such exclusion. Ulster could now remove itself from the rule of Dublin.
One question remained to be resolved: the precise borders of the counties of Fermanagh and Tyrone that could vote for exclusion. It was clear that the overwhelmingly Catholic parts of both counties, contiguous as they were to southern Ireland, must be allowed to adhere to Dublin. On July 25, in the wake of the failure of the Buckingham Palace Conference, the Cabinet met again. 'And so,' Churchill later wrote, 'turning this way and that in search of an exit from the deadlock, the Cabinet toiled around the muddy byways of Fermanagh and Tyrone. One had hoped that the events of April at the Curragh and in Belfast would have shocked British public opinion, and formed a unity sufficient to impose a settlement on the Irish factions. Apparently they had been insufficient. Apparently the conflict would be carried one stage further by both sides with incalculable consequences for both sides.'
For more than an hour the Ministers talked. 'The discussion had reached its inconclusive end,' Churchill later wrote, 'and the Cabinet was about to separate, when the grave, quiet tones of Sir Edward Grey's voice were heard reading a document which had just been brought to him from the Foreign Office.' It was the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, delivered almost a month after the assassination of the Archduke.
Grey had been reading the document, or speaking about it, 'for several minutes', Churchill recalled, 'before I could disengage my mind from the tedious and bewildering debate which had just closed. We were all very tired, but gradually as the phrases and sentences followed one another, impressions of a wholly different character began to form in my mind. As the reading proceeded it seemed absolutely impossible that any State in the world could accept it, or that any acceptance, however abject, would satisfy the aggressor. The parishes of Fermanagh and Tyrone faded into the mists and squalls of Ireland, and a strange light began immediately, but by perceptible gradations, to fall and grow upon the map of Europe.'
Returning to the Admiralty, Churchill wrote to Clementine, who was on holiday with Diana and Randolph at Cromer: 'Europe is trembling on the verge of a general war, the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia being the most insolent document of its kind ever devised. Side by side with this, the Provisional Government in Ulster which is now imminent appears comparatively a humdrum affair.' That night Churchill dined with German shipping magnate Alfred Ballin, a confidant of the Kaiser. Ballin spoke gloomily of a sequence of events that could lead to war between Britain and Germany. 'If Russia marches against Austria we must march,' Ballin warned, 'and if we march France must march, and what would England do?'
Churchill replied that he did not know; that it would be up to the Cabinet to decide; but that it would be a mistake for Germany to assume that Britain would do nothing in the event of a Franco-German war. The British Government, he told Ballin, 'would judge events as they arose'. The two men said goodnight, Churchill, with tears in his eyes, imploring Ballin not to let Germany go to war with France.
The Serbian Government, hoping to avoid war with Austria, sent a conciliatory reply to the ultimatum, agreeing to suppress all subversive anti-Austrian movements on Serbian soil, and to bring to justice anyone concerned with the murder of the Archduke. Although Serbia would not agree to any Austrian representative participating in the judicial process, she was willing to submit the whole issue either to the International Tribunal at The Hague, or to the Great Powers in concert. The German Kaiser was impressed. 'A great moral victory for Vienna,' he wrote, 'but with it every reason for war disappears.' Nevertheless, in the Kaiser's view, 'as a visible satisfaction d'honneur for Austria, the Austrian Army should temporarily occupy Belgrade as a pledge'. Such an action need not necessarily involve Britain. 'Happily there seems to be no reason why we should be anything more than spectators,' Asquith told the King on July 25.
Serbia's conciliatory reply to Austria was sent from Belgrade to Vienna on July 25. That morning Churchill and Prince Louis discussed whether to disperse the ships of the Third Fleet, already mobilised, and together, as a result of the test mobilisation plans of the previous year. They decided that the situation was not sufficiently serious to warrant keeping the ships together. At midday, having put off an afternoon conference with his advisers, Churchill took the train to Norfolk, to join his family at the seaside.
At nine o'clock on the morning of July 26 Churchill telephoned Prince Louis from the local Post Office in Cromer. The news he was given was not good; Austria-Hungary was apparently dissatisfied with Serbia's conciliatory reply to its ultimatum. Churchill went to the beach, where for three hours he played with his son and daughter, damming the rivulets which ran down the low cliffs to the sea. At noon he returned to the Post Office to speak to Prince Louis again. This time he learned even more disturbing news: Austria had entirely rejected the Serbian answer.
Suddenly the possibility drew much nearer of an Austrian invasion of Serbia which would draw Germany, Russia and France into the conflict. Germany might seek to attack and defeat France at the outset of war, before turning on Russia. In attacking France, Germany would almost certainly advance through Belgium, whose neutrality Britain was pledged to uphold.
Churchill and Prince Louis discussed what should be done. It was difficult, if not impossible, to conduct such sensitive business on the telephone. Churchill believed, as he wrote a year later, that he had specifically asked Prince Louis 'not to let the Fleet disperse'. Prince Louis recalled their conversation differently, insisting that Churchill had not given him any specific instructions, but had 'begged me to take whatever steps I might consider advisable without waiting to consult you over the telephone. I had great difficulty in hearing you. I certainly never heard any reference to keeping the Fleet together.' On his own initiative, Prince Louis later claimed, he went to the Foreign Office and, at five past four, signalled to the commander of the Home Fleets ordering him not to disperse his ships.
Returning to London at ten o'clock that evening, Churchill went first to the Admiralty, then to the Foreign Office, where Grey told him that Austria seemed determined to force its quarrel with Serbia to the point of war. Would it be helpful, Churchill asked, if the Admiralty were to issue a public statement announcing that the dispersal of the Fleet had been halted? Grey said that it would; that an immediate announcement to that effect would serve as a salutary warning both to Austria and to Germany. Back at the Admiralty, Churchill drafted, with Prince Louis, an official communiqué for the Press: 'Orders have been given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated at Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre leave for the present. All vessels of the Second Fleet are remaining at their home ports in proximity to their balance crews.'
This announcement was published in The Times on the morning of July 27. 'It looked innocent enough,' Churchill later wrote, 'but we hoped the German Emperor at any rate would understand.' When the Cabinet met that morning, however, a majority of Ministers were opposed to any British action against Germany in the event of a German invasion of France. It was pointed out that Britain had no formal alliance with France. 'The Cabinet,' Churchill later wrote, 'was absolutely against war and would never have agreed to being committed to war at this moment.'
Churchill's duty as First Lord of the Admiralty was to ensure that if war came Britain would not be caught unprepared against either naval or air attack. That afternoon he went to Downing Street and obtained Asquith's approval for sending armed guards to all ammunition depots and oil tanks. Orders were also sent out from the Admiralty for armed guards to man all coastal lights and guns. The torpedo reserve was completed. Also on July 27, Churchill ordered an end to the continuing naval blockade off Dundalk and Carrickfergus; all vessels engaged in stopping gun-running to Ulster were sent to their war stations.
In view of Austria-Hungary's naval strength in the Mediterranean, and Britain's interests there, especially in Egypt, Churchill signalled to the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean on July 27: 'European political situation makes war between Triple Alliance and Triple Entente Powers by no means impossible. This is not the warning telegram, but be prepared to shadow possible hostile men-of-war.' The Admiral was also instructed to concentrate his ships at Malta and to load them with stores and coal. 'Measure is purely precautionary,' Churchill stressed. 'The utmost secrecy is to be observed, and no unnecessary person is to be informed.'
By nightfall on July 27 all vulnerable points along the North Sea coast, chief among them oil tanks and ammunition stores, had been protected by anti-aircraft guns. That day all the Patrol flotillas were raised to full strength and, Churchill informed the King on the following day, 'are moving in succession to their war stations'. For the air defence of Britain, 'The aircraft are collected at and around the estuary of the Thames to guard against airship attack.'
On July 28 Churchill lunched with Kitchener, who was in Britain on a short visit from Egypt, to receive an Earldom. Churchill was so impressed by Kitchener's grasp of the likely severity of a German attack on France that he prevailed upon Asquith not to let his former adversary return to Egypt. Asquith decided to make Kitchener Secretary of State for War; it would undermine Conservative criticism of an all-Liberal war leadership. Kitchener, meanwhile, had set off for Dover by train; Churchill sent messages, the train was halted, and brought back to London.
During July 28 the German High Command in Berlin pressed Austria-Hungary to invade Serbia at once and present the world with a fait accompli. Grey urged Austria to step back from the brink, but was told by the British Ambassador in Vienna that postponement or prevention of war with Serbia 'would undoubtedly be a great disappointment in this country, which has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war'. That day, continuing with his naval preparations, Churchill ordered minesweepers to be collected. He also took steps to reinforce the small British naval squadron in the Far East to prevent its being outmatched by the superior German naval forces there.
The First Fleet, having been ordered not to disperse, was in the Channel, concentrated off the Isle of Wight. Although in such a position it constituted a formidable fighting force, its war station in the event of war with Germany was not in the Channel but in the North Sea. On the afternoon of July 28, after consulting with Prince Louis, Churchill decided to send the Fleet into the North Sea at once, hoping thereby both to deter the Germans from any sudden attack on the East Coast, and to intimate that Britain was prepared if necessary to enter the European conflict. 'I feared to bring this matter before the Cabinet,' Churchill later wrote, 'lest it should mistakenly be considered a provocative action likely to damage the chance of peace.' He therefore went to Downing Street to see Asquith, explaining his intentions. 'He looked at me with a hard stare,' Churchill later wrote, 'and gave a sort of grunt. I did not require anything else.'
Returning to the Admiralty, Churchill signalled to the Admiral in charge of the First Fleet that he should sail from Portland to the North Sea. 'Destination is to be kept secret except to flag and commanding officers. Course from Portland is to be shaped to southward, then a middle-Channel course to the Straits of Dover. The squadrons are to pass the Straits without lights.' Later that evening the Cabinet learned that Austria-Hungary had declared war on Serbia. At midnight Churchill wrote to his wife from the Admiralty:
My darling one & beautiful,
Everything tends towards catastrophe & collapse. I am interested, geared up & happy. Is it not horrible to be built like that? The preparations have a hideous fascination for me. I pray to God to forgive me for such fearful moods of levity. Yet I would do my best for peace, & nothing would induce me wrongfully to strike the blow.
I cannot feel that we in this island are in any serious degree responsible for the wave of madness which has swept the mind of Christendom. No one can measure the consequences. I wondered whether those stupid Kings & Emperors could not assemble together & revivify kingship by saving the nations from hell but we all drift on in a kind of dull cataleptic trance. As if it was somebody else's operation.
The two black swans on St James's Park lake have a darling cygnet-grey, fluffy, precious & unique. I watched them this evening for some time as a relief from all the plans & schemes. We are putting the whole Navy into fighting trim (bar the reserves). And all seems quite sound & thorough. The sailors are thrilled and confident. Every supply is up to the prescribed standard. Everything is ready as it has never been before. And we are awake to the tip of our fingers. But war is the Unknown & the Unexpected!
God guard us and our long accumulated inheritance. You know how willingly & proudly I would risk-or give-if need be-my period of existence to keep this country great & famous & prosperous & free. But the problems are very difficult. One has to try to measure the indefinite & weigh the imponderable.
I feel sure however that if war comes we shall give them a good drubbing.
Churchill's reference in this letter to the 'Kings & Emperors' was not mere musing; speaking of the possibility of a European war to his Cabinet colleagues on the morning of July 29 he declared that it was 'an appalling calamity for civilised nations to contemplate', and thought that the European sovereigns could possibly 'be brought together for the sake of peace'.
The Cabinet of July 29 agreed with Churchill's request to put into force a series of precautionary defensive measures. All naval harbours were cleared of civilian vessels, armed guards were sent to bridges and viaducts, and watchers were sent to the coast to report on any hostile ship. But opinion in the Cabinet was divided as to what would constitute cause for war; at least half Asquith's Ministers were unwilling to contemplate war with Germany if France was attacked, reiterating that Britain had no alliance with France.
Churchill was convinced that a German invasion of France would constitute a reason for war. Fearing a split Cabinet, indecision, and possibly even the fall of the Liberal Government, he began to make enquiries, when the Cabinet meeting was over, through F.E. Smith, of the possibility of a Coalition Government based upon British military support for France. Several of the Conservatives whom Smith approached, including Carson, were favourably disposed to such a Coalition. Bonar Law, however, rejected the idea.
On the morning of July 30, when Churchill and his senior officers were at their daily Staff meeting, a signal arrived: the First Fleet had reached the North Sea. Churchill was filled with an immediate sense of relief. 'Always in my mind in the years of preparation,' he later wrote, 'had been the episode of the Russian Fleet surprised by a torpedo attack at anchor off Port Arthur. Hostilities before or simultaneous with the declaration of war had been one of our many nightmares.'
During July 30, convinced that in the end Britain would be at war as the ally of France, Churchill instructed the Admiral commanding the British forces in the Mediterranean to be prepared, as his 'first task', to help the passage of French troop transports from North Africa to Metropolitan France 'by covering and if possible by bringing to action individual German ships', in particular the battle-cruiser Goeben, which was even then leaving the Adriatic for the Mediterranean. That night Churchill dined with Asquith. 'Serene as ever,' he reported to Clementine. 'But he backs me well in all the necessary measures.'
On the following day, July 31, the Cabinet learned of strong Liberal Party opposition to any British involvement in a European war on behalf of France. 'So long as no treaty obligation or true British interest is involved,' Churchill wrote to a non-interventionist Liberal MP that day, 'I am of your opinion that we should remain neutral. Balkan quarrels are no concern of ours. We have done our best to keep the peace and shall continue to do so. But the march of events is sinister.'
That day the German Government suggested secretly that Britain should remain neutral in return for a German promise not to take French territory or to invade Holland. Germany would wish to acquire French overseas colonies, however, and could not promise not to invade Belgium. Yet Germany was bound by treaty 'not merely to respect but to defend' Belgium, Churchill pointed out to Clementine.
Grey replied to the German proposals by describing them as 'impossible & disgraceful'. Everything pointed therefore to a collision on these two points. 'Still hope is not dead,' Churchill told Clementine. He thought that Germany was realising 'how great are the forces against her & is trying tardily to restrain her idiot ally', Austria-Hungary. For her part, Britain was working 'to soothe Russia'. But, Churchill added, 'everybody is preparing swiftly for war and at any moment the stroke may fall. We are ready.'
Proudly Churchill told Clementine: 'I could not tell you all the things I have done & the responsibilities I have taken in the last few days: but all is working out well; & everyone has responded. The newspapers have observed an admirable reticence.' His friend de Forest, an Austrian Baron and a British MP, had been told his yacht was ordered out of Dover harbour. Hurriedly he left London for Dover. 'As he journeyed down the line,' Churchill wrote, 'he found every bridge & tunnel guarded & became increasingly terrified. He telegraphed frantically clamouring for debates & questions in Parliament. Not a man moved-not a question nor so far any mention in the papers. The country will be united when the issue is joined. Be sure of it.'
That night Churchill authorised his senior naval advisers to confer with the French Naval Attaché in London on measures which should be taken together should France and Britain find themselves allies in war. He also sent out summonses to all naval reservists, to enable a complete mobilisation of the Fleet to take place the moment the Cabinet gave its authority.
On the morning of August 1, despite the failure of his Coalition suggestion, Churchill received a letter from F.E. Smith with a Conservative assurance that 'on the facts as we understand them & more particularly on the assumption (which we understand to be certain) that Germany contemplates a violation of Belgian neutrality, the Government can rely upon the support of the Unionist Party'. Churchill read out this assurance to the Cabinet where, he reported back to Smith, 'it produced a profound impression'. His own view that morning was clear. 'I cannot think war will be averted now,' he told Smith. 'Germany must march through Belgium, and I believe that the bulk of both parties will stand firm against that.'
That morning Churchill asked the Cabinet to authorise full naval mobilisation. But Ministers were still divided, Lloyd George giving a lead to those who were reluctant to commit Britain in support of France. In a letter to Clementine's cousin Venetia Stanley, Asquith wrote: 'Lloyd George, all for peace, is more statesmanlike for keeping the position open. Winston very bellicose and demanding immediate mobilisation.' As the Cabinet discussed the crisis, it was clear that many Ministers were unwilling to go to war despite a German threat to France, or even to Belgium. Churchill himself was reluctant to make an immediate commitment that day to go to war with Germany if Belgium were invaded. 'At the present moment,' he told Lloyd George in a note which he pushed across the Cabinet table, 'I would act in such a way as to impress Germany with our intention to preserve the neutrality of Belgium. So much is still unknown as to the definite purpose of Germany that I would not go beyond this.' But Churchill warned that if the Germans invaded Belgium British public opinion 'might veer round at any moment, & we must be ready to meet this opinion'.
Churchill sought to persuade Lloyd George that it might be necessary to go to war. 'I am most profoundly anxious that our long co-operation may not be severed,' he explained in another note passed across the Cabinet table. 'Remember your part at Agadir. I implore you to come and bring your mighty aid to the discharge of our duty. Afterwards by participating in the peace we can regulate the settlement & prevent a renewal of 1870 conditions.' In a further attempt to influence Lloyd George that day, Churchill sent an Army officer, Major Ollivant, to see him. For the previous year Ollivant had been the War Office liaison officer with the Naval War Staff; Germany's 'chief object as far as this country is concerned,' he explained to Lloyd George, 'lies in preventing the arrival of the British expeditionary army. There is reason to suppose that the presence or absence of the British army will determine the action of the Belgian army. It will very probably decide the fate of France.'
Lloyd George could still not make up his mind whether a German attack on Belgium really would constitute an adequate reason for declaring war on Germany. 'All the rest of our lives we shall be opposed,' Churchill warned him, adding, 'I am deeply attached to you & have followed your instinct & guidance for nearly ten years.'
During August 1 Churchill received an assurance from an influential member of the Conservative Party, Lord Robert Cecil, that if the Government were to send an expeditionary force across the Channel, 'they may count on the support of the whole Unionist Party'. Later that day, however, it seemed as if the crisis might be defused. 'The news tonight opens again hope,' he wrote to Cecil. 'There seems to be the prospect of Austria & Russia resuming negotiations on a formula which Germany has proposed: and every exertion will be made to that end. But a collision between the armies may arise at any moment out of an incident or an accident. And I hold that in all the circumstances if we allowed Belgian neutrality to be trampled down by Germany without exerting ourselves to aid France we should be in a very melancholy position both in regard to our interests & our honour.'
That night Churchill dined alone. Shortly after nine o'clock F.E. Smith called to see him. With him was Max Aitken, later Lord Beaverbrook, a Canadian financier, Conservative MP, and confidant of Bonar Law. Churchill repeated to them what he had written to Cecil, that there was now a chance of war being averted. The three men sat together for a while. 'The suspense was becoming intolerable,' Churchill later wrote. 'I was to see the Prime Minister at eleven that night. Meanwhile there was nothing to be done. We sat down at a card table and began a game of bridge. The cards had just been dealt when another red Foreign Office box came in. I opened it and read, "War declared by Germany on Russia".'
Churchill knew that it could not be long before Germany attacked Russia's ally, France. Leaving his two friends he crossed Horse Guards Parade to 10 Downing Street, where he told Asquith that, despite the Cabinet's refusal earlier that day, he wished to issue an immediate order for full naval mobilisation. 'The Prime Minister simply looked at me and said no word,' Churchill later recalled. 'No doubt he felt himself bound by the morning's decision of the Cabinet. I certainly, however, sustained the impression that he would not put out a finger to stop me. I then walked back to the Admiralty across the Parade Ground and gave the order.' It was midnight; 'I am sorry to say,' he wrote just after midnight to Lord Robert Cecil, 'that since I wrote to you we have learned officially that Germany has declared war on Russia. I cannot think that the rupture with France can be long delayed. And the course of events is likely to be very serious as regards Belgium.'
'Cat dear,' Churchill wrote to Clementine at 1 a.m., 'It is all up. Germany has quenched the last hopes of peace by declaring war on Russia, & the declaration against France is momentarily expected.' On the previous day she had written to him to say that war would be lunacy. 'I profoundly understand your views,' he replied. 'But the world is gone mad-& we must look after ourselves-& our friends.' He hoped she would come up to London for a day or two. 'I miss you much-& your influence when guiding & not contrary is of the utmost use to me.'
The Russian Government now called on France to honour the Franco-Russian Treaty of 1894. At the same moment the Germans prepared to knock France out of the war first, then turn against Russia. The German plan of attack on France was based on an initial drive through Belgium. It was on the basis of that plan that Churchill had predicted, in 1911, that the decisive battle would be fought on the fortieth day, and assessed the likely events leading up to that fortieth day.
Shortly after midday on August 2 the British Government informed Germany that it 'would not allow the passage of German ships through the English Channel or the North Sea in order to attack the coast or shipping of France'. In sending the text of this note to naval commanders in the Channel and North Sea, the Admiralty added, 'Be prepared to meet surprise attacks.'
Lloyd George was gradually accepting the view that Britain must come to the aid of Belgium, but had still not committed himself. To encourage him to do so, Churchill passed him another note during the Cabinet meeting on the evening of August 2 about the opportunities which war would open up in the social field: 'Together we can carry a wide social policy-on the conference basis, your idea-which you taught me. The naval war will be cheap-not more than 25 millions a year.' Churchill added, with an appeal to Lloyd George's qualities which he so admired, and to his vanity, 'You alone can take the measures which will assure food being kept abundant & cheap to the people.'
Still the German armies made no move to cross the Belgian frontier, though their troops were moving towards it and had already occupied the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. On the morning of August 3 the Cabinet learned that Germany had sent an ultimatum to Belgium, demanding the right of passage of German troops across Belgium. It was agreed that Britain must now intervene to insist that Belgian neutrality be maintained. Devastated by the very thought of a British involvement in a European war, Lord Morley told Churchill that he would resign. Churchill answered, he later recalled, that if Morley would wait for two or three days more, 'everything would be clear, and we should be in full agreement. The Germans would make everyone easy in his conscience. They would accept all responsibilities and sweep away all doubts. Already their vanguards pouring through Luxemburg approached the Belgian frontier. Nothing could recall or deflect them.'
Morley was not convinced. Churchill offered to illustrate the German military movements on a map, but Morley's mind was made up. 'If we have to fight,' he said, 'we must fight with single-hearted conviction. There is no place for me in such affairs.' Morley resigned, as did two other Cabinet Ministers. The rest of the Cabinet began to discuss not the rights and wrongs of becoming involved in the European quarrel, but how most effectively to participate in it. 'I am so glad that you are turning your mind to the vital question of safeguarding the credit & food supply of this country,' Churchill wrote to Lloyd George in yet another note pushed across the Cabinet table.
That afternoon, German troops crossed the Belgian frontier. Speaking in the House of Commons, Grey warned that this act, a violation of Britain's Treaty of 1839, might force Britain to go to war. After his speech he left the Chamber with Churchill.
'What happens now?' Churchill asked.
'Now,' replied Grey, 'we shall send them an ultimatum to stop the invasion of Belgium within twenty-four hours.'
Returning to his room at the Admiralty, Churchill sent a message to Asquith and Grey, asking them to give their immediate authorisation 'to put into force the combined Anglo-French dispositions for the defence of the Channel'. Unless he was expressly forbidden to do this, Churchill added, 'I shall act accordingly'. This joint action, he assured Asquith and Grey, while essential for security against a German naval attack in the Channel, 'implies no offensive action & no warlike action unless we are attacked'. The extent of Churchill's preparations was well known and not unappreciated. On the morning of August 4 The Times described him as the one Minister 'whose grasp of the situation and whose efforts to meet it have been above all praise'.
The British ultimatum to Germany, demanding the maintenance of Belgian neutrality, was to expire at midnight Berlin time on August 4. Throughout that day the Cabinet waited in tense expectation. Churchill was particularly worried about how quickly British naval forces could be ordered into action. During the day the German battle cruiser Goeben bombarded the French North African port of Philippeville, while the light cruiser Breslau bombarded Bône. As a result of Churchill's earlier order, British warships were shadowing both vessels, but as Britain was not yet at war, they could take no action. During the day Churchill begged Asquith and Grey to allow him to order the ships to open fire. 'It would be a great misfortune to lose these vessels as is possible in the dark hours.'
Anticipating another favourable, if equally unspoken, response from Asquith, Churchill telegraphed to the British Admiral, 'If Goeben attacks French transports you should at once engage her.' But Asquith now wanted the matter put to the Cabinet, writing at noon that day to Venetia Stanley, 'Winston, who has got on all his war paint, is longing for a sea fight in the early hours of the morning to result in the sinking of the Goeben.' The Cabinet listened to Churchill's explanation of why the German battle cruiser should be hunted down. The German Navy's ability to prevent French reinforcements getting from North Africa to France was considerable. Only British warships had the necessary power to stop her. The Cabinet was insistent, however, that no British act of war should take place before the ultimatum expired an hour before midnight.
Returning to the Admiralty at two o'clock that afternoon, Churchill telegraphed to all ships, 'No acts of war should be committed before that hour.' In the signal to the Admiral shadowing the two German warships in the Mediterranean, he added that this signal 'cancels the authorisation' to engage the Goeben.
The Germans made no reply to the British ultimatum. That afternoon their troops drove deeper into Belgium. On the evening of August 4, Churchill dined at Admiralty House with his mother, his brother and Geoffrey Robinson, the editor of The Times. When dinner was over he held a conference with a delegation of French Admirals, who asked if they could have the use of a British naval base in the Mediterranean, from which to protect their trade and troop transports. Churchill responded with alacrity: 'Use Malta as if it were Toulon.'
Still no reply to the British ultimatum reached London, only the news of a continued German advance into Belgium. At eleven o'clock that night the ultimatum expired. Churchill at once authorised a signal to be sent from the Admiralty to all ships and naval establishments, 'Commence hostilities against Germany.' Britain and Germany were at war; at a quarter past eleven he once more crossed Horse Guards Parade to 10 Downing Street, where he told Asquith that the signal had been sent. Lloyd George, who was already with the Prime Minister, later told a friend: 'Winston dashed into the room, radiant, his face bright, his manner keen, one word pouring out on another how he was going to send telegrams to the Mediterranean, the North Sea, and God knows where. You could see he was a really happy man.'
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